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DEVILS IN THE DETAILS: AN ESSAY EXAMINING THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF JURISDICTIONAL DEFAULT RULES IN
THE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS CONTEXT
Choice of law is one of those concepts that law school professors love to
focus on in different courses. However, the concept raises the question: does
choice of law make a practical difference? The short answer is no. Generally
speaking, laws between U.S. states rarely diverge to the degree that would
prompt individuals to sue exclusively in state X over state Y. Differences in
laws between U.S. states carry de minimis value and only become a heightened
concern on a specific case by case basis. There are exceptions to this general
rule. In the realm of mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”), U.S. state laws and
court opinions addressing “sandbagging,” 1 waiver of jury trial, and noncompete provisions are several of these exceptions. For example, it is
universally agreed in the M&A world that Delaware, New York, and
California are, respectively, “pro-sandbagging,” neutral/ambiguous toward
sandbagging, and “anti-sandbagging.” But why are there differences and why
do they matter? This Essay attempts to answer these questions as well as
provide an analysis of the three aforementioned provisions found in M&A
agreements nationwide.
First, this Essay will outline its scope and goals accompanied by a brief
foundation of mergers and acquisitions. Second, it will demonstrate the effect
of a jurisdiction’s default rule in an M&A deal followed by a detailed
discussion of each M&A provision—sandbagging, waiver of jury trial, and
non-compete—and various jurisdictional default responses. Third, it will put
forward alternative theories and reasons why Delaware, New York, and
California approach sandbagging, waiver of jury trial, and non-compete
provisions in their respective ways.
INTRODUCTION
Before this Essay continues with its analysis of the above-mentioned M&A
provisions and varying jurisdictional treatment of those provisions, a brief
foundation of M&A is needed. The terms mergers and acquisitions are often
1 Generally, the term “sandbagging” refers to the contract provision that addresses the impact and result
of one party’s pre-closing knowledge of a breach of another’s warranty in an agreement. Aleksandra Miziolek
& Dimitrios Angelakos, From Poker to the World of Mergers and Acquisitions, MICH. B. J. 30, 30–31 (2013).
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used interchangeably; however, the two terms are fundamentally different.
Without getting into an advanced discussion, an acquisition refers to one
business entity buying another either in its entirety or in part. 2 On the other
hand, a merger refers to two separate business entities combining together to
form a completely new business entity. 3 Therefore, although the two terms are
used interchangeably, it is important to know they refer to two different
situations and should not be used synonymously. 4
Broadly defined, mergers and acquisitions are one of many corporate tools
at the disposal of corporate officers, boards of directors, and shareholders 5 in
stimulating growth for their organizations. While 2016 has been characterized
as a “bumpy year” 6 for M&A activity, a recent survey conducted by a “Big
Four” accounting firm, Deloitte, LLP, asked 1,000 corporate and private equity
investors to weigh in on what they thought 2017 would hold for M&A
activity. 7 The survey’s results indicated that roughly 75% of the investors
believe M&A activity will increase in 2017 and, more importantly, 64% of the
respondents believe respective deal sizes will increase as well. Given the
expected increase in M&A activity, this is an opportune time to study M&A
transactions and how they may vary from state to state.
This Essay’s scope is primarily centered on the case study of the three
M&A provisions—sandbagging, waiver of jury trial, and non-compete—and
their respective treatment in Delaware, New York, and California. These three
common provisions found in M&A agreements were chosen for examination
because they highlight various jurisdictions’ divergent approaches. The
jurisdictions of Delaware, New York, and California were chosen because each
state is highly representative of its respective category of jurisdiction.
Moreover, these three states see their fair share of M&A deals. 8 This Essay
2

Mergers
And
Acquisitions-M&A,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/
mergersandacquisitions.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).
3 Id.
4 It is also important to note that there are other subgroups of mergers and acquisitions, but this
discussion is outside the scope of this Essay. Additionally, this Essay will not weigh the benefits and costs of
choosing whether to merge or to acquire.
5 Often majority of shareholders entitled to vote need to approve a merger or acquisition action before
the corporate entity can proceed with the action. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (Lexis Advance through 81 Del.
Laws, ch. 2).
6 Russell Thomson et al., M&A trends report 2016, year-end edition, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.
com/us/en/pages/mergers-and-acquisitions/articles/ma-trends-report.html (last visited Mar. 2017).
7 Id.
8 In 2011, Delaware alone had roughly more than half of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and 60% of
Fortune 500 companies incorporated in its jurisdiction. Doug Bend, The Top 10 Reasons to Incorporate in
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does not close the door on mentioning other states’ treatment where relevant
and by no means does it intend to provide a state by state legal survey of each
state’s approach towards various M&A provisions. This Essay has two simple
goals. First, to highlight the importance of considering how a specific
jurisdiction’s approach may affect a M&A transaction and negotiation. Second,
to answer why Delaware, New York, and California have taken their respective
stances. In working towards these goals, this Essay will also answer why a
choice of law decision exists to begin with and why there is competition
among the states in the M&A realm.
I. SANDBAGGING, WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL, AND NON-COMPETE—WHY DO
THE DIFFERENCES MATTER?
To illustrate the importance of these three provisions and their respective
treatment, what follows is a hypothetical demonstrating the effect of
sandbagging. Imagine in the eleventh hour of a several yearlong negotiated
asset purchase agreement to acquire assets from Business S that Business B
finds an inaccuracy during their due diligence of Business S’s corporate
records. At this point, Business B must decide whether to disclose the
inaccuracy to Business S, which may further prolong the negotiations and the
overall timetable of the already lengthy deal, or to continue to closing and not
inform Business S of the inaccuracy. For obvious reasons, the former is
undesirable to Business B, especially given the facts. However, the aftermath
of the latter raises a couple of questions. While inaccuracies in corporate
records do not always cause noteworthy issues, it may turn out that the
inaccuracy causes a significant misrepresentation or breach of warranty by
Business S in the asset purchase agreement. Should Business S be liable to
Business B for damages sustained from the misrepresentation or breach?
Should Business S be liable to Business B if Business B knew about the
misrepresentation or breach ahead of time and chose not to disclose it to
Business S, who might have been able to remedy it before the closing of the
deal?
Although this illustration may appear trivial on its face, the answers to the
questions above determine whether years of hard work along with millions of
dollars go to waste. For example, Jurisdiction X may rule in favor of Business
S and force Business B to bear the costs. At the same time, Jurisdiction Y may
Delware, BEND L. GROUP, PROF. CORP. (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.bendlawoffice.com/2011/08/01/reasons-toincorporate-in-delaware/.

SZYCOWSKI GALLEYFINAL

444

5/5/2017 3:06 PM

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW

[Vol. 4

rule in favor of Business B and force Business S to remedy Business B’s
losses. A real-world example follows demonstrating the monetary impact a
default rule may have. In Cobalt Operating, LLC v. James Crystal Enterprises,
LLC, 9 Delaware’s pro-sandbagging default rule allowed the buyer in an asset
purchase agreement to recover at least $12 million from the $70 million
purchase price. 10 Thus, it is prudent for any business entity and its board of
directors contemplating a M&A transaction to be privy to the way its
jurisdiction(s) treats certain M&A provisions, especially those entities that
have footholds in several different jurisdictions. What follows is a breakdown
of the three M&A provisions along with how Delaware, New York, and
California treat each one and why.
A. Sandbagging
The term “sandbagging” has been said to be associated with the poker
strategy of refraining from raising at first in hopes of being able to raise more
steeply later. 11 Sandbagging occurs in a deal when a party, almost always the
buyer, seeks to recover, usually through an indemnification provision, for a
misrepresentation or breach of warranty for an inaccuracy that the party had
knowledge of prior to the closing. 12 While parties may contract around the
action of sandbagging via either pro-sandbagging or anti-sandbagging
provisions, it is crucial, especially in high dollar-figure deals, to know what
relevant default rules govern a particular jurisdiction are.
In determining whether a jurisdiction is pro-sandbagging or antisandbagging, the crux is whether the jurisdiction views the breach of warranty
claim as a tort claim or a breach of contract claim. 13 This distinction is
important because, in a tort claim, reliance is a necessary element. 14 If a party
knew of the breach of warranty beforehand, it could not argue reliance on the
warranty to its detriment. 15 This would be an example of an anti-sandbagging
jurisdiction. However, if the jurisdiction views the breach of warranty claim as
9

No. 714-VCS, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108 (Ch. July 20, 2007).
Id. at *2, *10; David K. Cho & Seon N. Chung, Sandbagging in M&A Transactions: Default Rules in
Delaware, New York and California, ONPOINT (Oct. 2016), https://info.dechert.com/10/7362/october2016/sandbagging-in-manda-transactions—default-rules-in-delaware—new-york-and-california-(final)(1).asp?
sid=d5f32a7d-6120-481f-a818-ec1badcaf96c.
11 Miziolek, supra note 1, at 30.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 32.
14 Id.
15 Id.
10
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a claim for breach of contract, then a party’s pre-closing knowledge is
irrelevant because reliance on the truth of the warranty is not a requirement for
recovery. 16 This would be an example of a pro-sandbagging jurisdiction.
Originally, Delaware was considered an anti-sandbagging jurisdiction. 17
However, in 2005 the Delaware Superior Court held in Interim Healthcare,
Inc. v. Spherion Corp., that reliance was not a requirement for a breach of
warranty claim and, more importantly, that the purchaser in the case had the
right to rely on the seller’s warranties. 18 Subsequently, the Supreme Court of
Delaware in James Crystal Enterprises, LLC v. Cobalt Operating, LLC
affirmed this latter view and rejected the tort approach when it was presented
with James Crystal Enterprises’ appeal, which was the real-world example
stated earlier. 19 These decisions solidify Delaware, at least for now, as a prosandbagging jurisdiction.
As mentioned earlier, New York is a bit more complex in its approach
towards sandbagging than Delaware. In CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Pub. Co., the
New York Court of Appeals diverged from past court opinions by holding that
the breach of contract ideology applied to breaches of warranties and that
reliance was still a necessary element of a breach of warranty. 20 However, the
court also held that reliance could be found if a party relied on the “express
warranty as being a part of the bargain between the parties” 21 rather than if the
party relied on the truth of the warranty itself. 22 The court found reliance
because the buyer believed it was purchasing the seller’s promise that the
warranties made were true. The Second Circuit later clarified the CBS Inc.
opinion via its holding in Galli v. Metz. 23 In Galli, the Second Circuit returned
to a more tort-esque approach by disallowing the party that knew of the breach

16

Miziolek, supra note 1, at 32.
Id.; Kelly v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., C.A. No. 99C-09-265 WCC, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 39 (Super.
Ct. Jan. 17, 2002).
18 884 A.2d 513, 548 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005) (stating that “[t]o the extent Spherion [the seller] warranted a
fact or circumstance to be true in the Agreement, plaintiffs were entitled to rely upon the accuracy of the
representation irregardless [sic] of what their due diligence may have or should have revealed. In this regard,
Spherion accepted the risk of loss to the full extent of its indemnification commitments in the event its
covenants were breached.”); see Charles K. Whitehead, Sandbagging: Default Rules and Acquisition
Agreements, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1081, 1109 (2011).
19 No. 491, 2007, 2008 Del. LEXIS 117 (Del. Mar. 11, 2008).
20 75 N.Y.2d 496, 503 (1990).
21 Id.
22 Miziolek, supra note 1, at 33.
23 973 F.2d 145, 150–51 (2d Cir. 1992).
17
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prior to closing to bring a breach claim post-closing. 24 To reconcile the
differences between these two cases, the Second Circuit in Rogath v.
Siebenmann 25 and the Southern District of New York in Gusmao v. GMT
Group, Inc. 26 found a middle ground by requiring a close examination of “the
extent and source of the buyer’s knowledge.” 27 This means that if the seller is
the source of the information that notifies the buyer of a breach before closing
between the seller and the buyer, then New York courts view the buyer as
having waived his/her right to recovery from that breach post-closing.
However, if the seller is not the source of the information that notifies the
buyer of the breach, then New York courts view the seller’s warranty or
representation as part of the bargain between the parties and allows the buyer
to recover, because New York courts do not view receiving information about
a breach from a third-party pre-closing as a waiver. 28 Thus, New York can be
best described as a neutral/ambiguous toward sandbagging jurisdiction given
its special nuanced approach.
California, on the other hand, requires buyer’s reliance to make a breach of
warranty claim. 29 California courts have long held and affirmed this rule. 30
Despite the Grinnell and Kazerouni cases and a strong history supporting antisandbagging provisions, one Northern District of California decision held that
California does not require a buyer to show reliance if a pro-sandbagging
provision is drafted into the M&A deal that expressly states the buyer’s
knowledge does not affect buyer’s reliance. 31 This means that if the parties in a
M&A deal agree that the buyer’s knowledge will not adversely affect his or her
24 Id. at 151 (stating that “[w]here a buyer closes on a contract in the full knowledge and acceptance of
facts disclosed by the seller which would constitute a breach of warranty under the terms of the contract, the
buyer should be foreclosed from later asserting the breach. In that situation, unless the buyer expressly
preserves his rights under the warranties (as CBS did in Ziff-Davis), we think the buyer has waived the
breach.”); Miziolek, supra note 1, at 33.
25 129 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 1997).
26 No. 06 Civ. 5113(GEL), 2008 WL 2980039 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008).
27 Rogath, 129 F.3d at 264; Miziolek, supra note 1, at 33–34.
28 See Rogath, 129 F.3d at 264 (citing Galli 973 F.2d at 151).
29 Cho, supra note 11.
30 See Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal.App.2d 424, 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); see also
Kazerouni v. De Satnick, 228 Cal.App.3d 871, 873–74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
31 Telephia, Inc. v. Cuppy, 411 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (stating that “Telephia argues
that it need not prove reliance because of the terms of the SPA. In § 6.1, the SPA states that ‘[n]o information
or knowledge obtained in any investigation pursuant to this Section 6.1 shall affect or be deemed to modify
any representation or warranty contained in this AgreementFalse’ . . . In addition, § 10.1 of the SPA provides,
‘No investigation made by or on behalf of the Company [Telephia] with respect to Criterion or the
Securityholders shall be deemed to affect the Company Affiliates’ . . . reliance on the representations,
warranties, covenants, and agreements made by Criterion.’”).
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ability to seek indemnification because of a misrepresentation or breach of
warranty of the seller, then the courts applying California law will honor the
parties’ agreement. Thus, except in the unique circumstance described above,
California has solidified itself as an anti-sandbagging jurisdiction.
B. Waiver of Jury Trial
Waiver of jury trial provisions are present in almost all transactional
agreements, not just in M&A deals. However, for the purposes of this Essay
only pre-litigation jury trial waivers will be addressed due to this Essay’s
M&A scope. Technically speaking, the right to a jury trial for civil litigants in
federal court is a right protected by the Seventh Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 32 Thus, one could reasonably believe that waiver of jury trial
provisions are constitutional issues. However, the Seventh Amendment does
not apply to the states. 33 States are thus allowed to decide whether parties to an
agreement can contract away their rights to a jury trial. Although most states
allow parties to waive their rights to a jury trial, two states have vehemently
opposed such provisions. 34 California and Georgia courts have held that prelitigation waiver of jury trial provisions are unenforceable. 35
For Georgia, the seminal case disapproving of jury trial waivers is Bank
South, N.A. v. Howard, which dates back to 1994. 36 The underlining case
involved a guaranty dispute. 37 However, the guaranty contained a waiver of
jury trial provision and the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari on that
issue alone. 38 The court justified its holding against the waiver by citing to the
Constitution of Georgia and the Civil Practice Act, 39 both of which state that
the right to a jury trial is a constitutional right. 40 The court also interpreted the

32

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 219 (1916) (stating that “But this affords no
ground for the proposition that the [Seventh] Amendment is applicable and controlling in proceedings in state
courts deriving their authority from state law, in the teeth of the express and settled doctrine that the
Amendment does not relate to proceedings in such courts.”); Nicole S. Magaline, 2 Unique Takes On Jury
Waiver Clauses, LAW360 (Mar. 3, 2011, 5:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/229586/2-unique-takeson-jury-waiver-clauses?article_related_content=1.
34 Magaline, supra note 34.
35 See Bank South, N.A. v. Howard, 264 Ga. 339 (1994); see Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court, 36
Cal. 4th 944 (2005).
36 See Bank South, 264 Ga. at 340–41.
37 Id. at 339.
38 Id.
39 Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-39(a).
40 Bank South, 264 Ga. at 340.
33
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fact that both the Constitution of Georgia and the Georgia Civil Practice Act
only mention jury trial waivers in the context of the beginning stages of
litigation as evidence that pre-litigation waiver of jury trial provisions are
unenforceable. 41 The court seemed to anchor its view on the premise that since
the right to a jury trial was considered a constitutional right, pre-litigation jury
trial waivers are subject to heightened scrutiny and fail to pass muster. 42 Thus,
a court applying Georgia law will not enforce a pre-litigation jury trial waiver
provision.
More recently, the California Supreme Court joined Georgia on this issue
in 2005 via its holding in Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court. 43 The
underlining dispute in Grafton Partners primarily centered on a breach of
contract claim between Grafton Partners and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP,
its then auditor. 44 The engagement letter between Grafton Partners and
PriceWaterhouseCoopers contained a pre-litigation waiver of jury trial
provision, which became the main issue on appeal after the trial court granted
PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ motion to strike Grafton Partners’ demand for a jury
trial. 45 The California Supreme Court approached the issue in the same fashion
as the Georgia Supreme Court. 46 Both courts turned to their respective state
constitutions and jury waiver statutes. 47 Since California’s constitution states
that the right to a jury trial is one protected by the state and California’s jury
waiver statute 48 only makes reference to waivers of juries once litigation has
commenced, the California Supreme Court reversed PriceWaterhouseCoopers’
motion to strike and held pre-litigation jury trial waivers provisions
unenforceable. 49 Consequently, a court applying California law will not allow
a party to a contract or agreement to waive its right to a jury trial before
litigation has commenced. 50 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit recently via its in
41

Id.
Id. (stating that “[g]iven the similarity of waivers of jury trial and confessions of judgment, and
considering the magnitude of the rights involved and the probability of abuse that exists in both situations,
waivers of jury trial are sufficiently analogous to confessions of judgment that the same rule should apply.”).
43 See Grafton Partners, 36 Cal. 4th at 967.
44 Id. at 950; Magaline, supra note 34.
45 Grafton Partners, 36 Cal. 4th at 951.
46 Magaline, supra note 34.
47 Id.; Grafton Partners, 36 Cal. 4th at 951.
48 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 631 (Deering, Lexis Advance through all 2016 legislation and propositions
(2016 Regular and 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sessions)); Magaline, supra note 34.
49 Grafton Partners, 36 Cal. 4th at 967.
50 It is important to note that while pre-litigation jury trial waivers are unenforceable in California, prelitigation jury trial waivers in the context of arbitration agreements are specifically enforceable under
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1281. Id. at 952, 955.
42
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re County of Orange ruling held that if a waiver of jury trial dispute arises
from actions in California to a federal court, then that federal court must apply
California law. 51 The Ninth Circuit resolved the discrepancy of treatment
between California law and federal law, which allows waivers as long as the
waivers meet the “knowing and voluntary” standard, by stating that the federal
standard is a constitutional minimum. 52 Thus, any state law that protects
litigants’ Seventh Amendment rights to a higher degree than federal law will
supersede the federal law in federal court. 53
C. Non-Compete
Similar to waiver of jury trial provisions, non-compete provisions are a
metaphoric can of worms. A non-compete provision in a contract or agreement
refers to a restrictive covenant on the part of one party to not compete with
another party in some stated capacity either post-closing or post-termination of
the agreement. 54 The treatment of these provisions vary widely from state-tostate. 55 Moreover, the study of non-compete provisions contains various facets
and is multidimensional in nature. 56 Thus, the following provides a brief
analysis that focuses on Delaware’s, New York’s, and California’s
enforcement of non-compete provisions.
Delaware and New York follow the approach that, as long as a noncompete provision is reasonable, it is enforceable. 57 Both states have
repeatedly affirmed this view. 58 Although their tests for reasonableness may

51

784 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2015).
County of Orange, 784 F.3d at 531.
53 Id. at 531–32.
54 Viva R. Moffat, Article, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 939, 940–42 (2012).
55 Id. at 943.
56 Within the category of states that enforce reasonable non-compete provisions, there are subcategories
that differ on the appropriate treatment of modification when they are presented with a non-compete provision
that is overbroad or overbearing. Id. at 948–49. For example, there is one subsect that follows the “blue pencil”
doctrine, which allows the jurisdiction to re-draft an unreasonable non-compete provision to bring it within the
spectrum of reasonableness. Id. Conversely, there are other jurisdictions that do not re-draft non-compete
provisions and, thus, when presented with an unreasonable non-compete provision, they will not enforce it. Id.
57 Ascension Insurance Holdings, LLC v. Underwood, No. 9897-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 19 (Ch.
Jan. 28, 2015); Moffat, supra note 55, at 948.
58 See generally Moffat, supra note 55; see also Ascension Insurance Holdings, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS
19; see also Nicholas J. Boyle & Richard A. Olderman, Restrictive Covenants: The Law In Flux, LAW360
(Feb. 4, 2016, 11:27 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/754308/restrictive-covenants-the-law-in-flux; see
also Summary of Covenants Not To Compete: A Global Perspective, FENWICK & WEST LLP (2009),
https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/RS_Summary-of-Covenants.pdf.
52
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differ slightly, 59 the two jurisdictions ascribe to the ideology that parties have
the right of freedom of contract. 60 This allows parties to an agreement to
contract and be bound by restrictive covenants. As recent as 2015, the Court of
Chancery of Delaware in Ascension Insurance Holdings, LLC v. Underwood
stated, “The ability to self-order is the sine qua non of free markets; without
the ability to hold and dispose of property, and to agree to be bound
contractually, no functional market could exist.” 61
On the other hand, California along with a handful of other states fervently
oppose the enforceability of non-compete provisions. 62 Section 16600 of
California’s Business & Professions Code states, “every contract by which
anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of
any kind is to that extent void.” 63 In Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, the
California Supreme Court stated that, “[Section 16600] protects Californians
and ensures ‘that every citizen shall retain the right to pursue any lawful
employment and enterprise of their choice.’” 64 In essence, California believes
the “right to work” outweighs the right of freedom of contract in the context of
non-compete provisions. The Edwards decision is also noteworthy because
Arthur Andersen argued for the court to adopt a narrow-restraint exception, but
the court ended up rejecting the proposition outright and re-affirmed
California’s strong stance of non-compete unenforceability. 65 However,
California does have a small carve out for M&A transactions. Section 16601 of
California’s Business & Professions Code states, “Any person who sells the
goodwill of a business, or any owner of a business entity selling or otherwise
disposing of all of his or her ownership interest in the business entity . . . may

59 Compare Ascension Insurance Holdings, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 19 at *6–7 (stating that “[u]nder
Delaware law, “[t]o be enforceable, a covenant not to compete must (1) meet general contract law
requirements, (2) be reasonable in scope and duration, both geographically and temporally, (3) advance a
legitimate economic interest of the party enforcing the covenant, and (4) survive a balance of the equities.”“),
with BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 388–89 (N.Y. 1999) (stating that “[a] restraint is reasonable
only if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, (2)
does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public.”); see Natural
Organics, Inc. v. Kirkendall, 52 A.D.3d 488, 489 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (stating that “[a] non-compete
agreement must also be reasonably limited temporally and geographically.”).
60 Ascension Insurance Holdings, 2015 Del. Ch. 19 at *6.
61 Id. at *19.
62 Moffat, supra note 55, at 944.
63 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (Deering, Lexis Advance through all 2016 legislation and propositions
(2016 Regular and 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sessions)).
64 44 Cal. 4th 937, 946 (2008) (quoting Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 22
Cal.App.4th 853, 859 (1994)).
65 Edwards, 44 Cal. 4th at 950.
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agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a
specified geographic area in which the business so sold.” 66 The California
Court of Appeal in Strategix, Ltd. v. Infocrossing West, Inc., explained that
Section 16601 protects the value of the asset sold, because without Section
16601 the seller would be able to compete with the buyer and reduce the value
of property right that buyer had just bought. 67 Thus, California generally
speaking does not enforce non-compete provisions.
II. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES TO TREATMENT DISCREPANCY
Having illustrated how Delaware, New York, and California treat
sandbagging, waiver of jury trial, and non-compete provisions in the context of
M&A deals, this Essay now shifts to examine and advance several alternative
theories as to why Delaware, New York, and California have such a
divergence of approaches. These theories include a state’s dependence on
franchise taxes, the importance of a state’s market size, and the influence of
state specific interest groups.
A. Delaware
Delaware’s particular treatment of the three aforementioned M&A
provisions can be better understood by acknowledging its dependence on
corporate fees and franchise taxes. As Professor William Cary details, shortly
before Delaware became home to more than half of Fortune 500 companies, it
largely lived in the shadow of New Jersey. 68 Around the 1890s, New Jersey
was modern-day Delaware due to its liberal corporate laws, and benefited
greatly. 69 During this time, New Jersey was collecting huge sums of money
from corporate filing fees and franchise taxes as a result of its liberal corporate
laws that by 1902 “it was able to abolish all property taxes and still pay off its
entire state debt.” 70 However, after Governor Woodrow Wilson in 1913
enacted the “Seven Sisters Laws,” 71 corporations began to re-incorporate in
66 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16601 (Deering, Lexis Advance through all 2016 legislation and propositions
(2016 Regular and 2015–2016 2nd Ex. Sessions)).
67 142 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 1072–73 (2006).
68 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 664
(1974).
69 Id. at 664.
70 Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL .J. CORP. L.
249, 268 (1976).
71 Id. at 270 (These seven detailed provisions generally outlawed the trust and the holding company as
well as restricted corporate authority.).
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Delaware. 72 Delaware’s primary goal for copying New Jersey’s then corporate
code was to obtain a new source of revenue for the state and that it did. 73
Franchise taxes alone made up roughly 16% of Delaware’s 2015 state
budget, 74 but others have argued that income from corporate fees and franchise
taxes to be closer to one-quarter of Delaware’s state budget. 75 Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude that some of the legislature’s and judiciary’s actions are
motivated with the state budget in mind. This is supported by the fact that
Delaware has a population of only 952,065 and is one of the smallest states. 76
With a relatively small population and small land mass, Delaware is limited in
sources of revenue.
Another alternative theory for Delaware’s treatment of the three M&A
provisions is the “revolving door” movement of interested parties. In
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, Professor Cary
proved using hard data that Chief Justices of the Delaware Supreme Court
throughout their careers were switching between roles as judges, legislators,
and corporate attorneys. 77 He hinted to the development of an unhealthy
relationship between the private corporate sector and the Delaware state
government. 78 Although this was not occurring all at the same time and by
everyone, it is still demonstrates that certain judges and representatives held
some bias in favor of corporations, especially if they intended to have a career
off the bench.
These two theories help explain why Delaware is pro-sandbagging, permits
waiver of jury trial, and permits reasonable non-compete provisions. Delaware
is beholden to its Fortune 500 residents and the benefits that relationship
produces. In an effort to retain those benefits, Delaware, through its legislature
and judiciary promulgated laws and case decisions that favor corporations,
especially large corporations. In the M&A context, these corporations would
be the typical buyers in a deal and, thus, Delaware’s treatment of the three
M&A provisions is clearly pro-buyer.

72

Cary, supra note 69, at 664.
Id.
74 Governor’s Budget Financial Summary and Charts, STATE OF DELAWARE (2017), http://budget.
delaware.gov/budget/fy2017/documents/operating/vol1/financial-summary.pdf.
75 Cary, supra note 69, at 697–98.
76 QuickFacts: Delaware, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/
PST045216/10 (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
77 Cary, supra note 69, at 690–92.
78 Id.
73
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B. New York
Contrary to Delaware, New York holds greater leeway in drafting its laws
and case decisions because it has a larger population, it is less reliant on
franchise taxes, and has a bigger market size. New York has a population of
around 19,745,289 and a land area of 47,126.40 square miles. 79 In addition, the
New York state budget is far less reliant on franchise taxes and corporate fees
for revenue. 80 With around 536,890 employer establishments in New York
compared to Delaware’s 24,312, corporations and other business entities have
less bargaining power to reject New York law-via threatening to exit the statethan in Delaware. 81 This is especially true given that corporations by their very
nature desire to grow and increase their profit margins. For these reasons, New
York is less beholden to corporations than Delaware and this is demonstrated
in New York’s treatment of the three aforesaid M&A provisions.
As discussed in Part II, New York has a nuanced approach toward
sandbagging, permits waiver of jury trial, and permits reasonable non-compete
provisions. Although New York and Delaware have real-world differences and
their respective approaches on sandbagging differ slightly, they generally
appear to approach the three M&A provisions in a similar manner. A possible
explanation for this consistency could be the housing and influence of Wall
Street along with some of the U.S.’s major financial institutions. Thus, New
York’s treatment of the three M&A provisions suggests that it is also a probuyer jurisdiction.
C. California
With scarcely any of its budget stemming from franchise taxes and a large
market size, California is barely in a position to be influenced by pro-buyer or
pro-large corporation forces and of the three case studies carries the greatest
amount of independence. California has a population of roughly 39,250,017
and a land area of 155,779.22 square miles. 82 Its projected budget for 20172018 estimates around 90.6% of its revenue to be generated from personal

79 QuickFacts: New York, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/
PST045216/36 (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
80 Government Revenue Details, USGOVERNMENTREVENUE.COM, http://www.usgovernmentrevenue.com/
year_revenue_2017NYbs_18bs1n_40305060#usgs302 (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
81 QuickFacts: New York, supra note 80.
82 QuickFacts: California, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/
PST045216/06 (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
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income taxes, sales taxes, use taxes, and insurance taxes. 83 If the rest of
California’s sources of revenue were combined, those sources would only
make up roughly 9.4% of the budget. 84 These other sources would include not
only franchise taxes, but also corporate taxes as well as other taxes and fees. 85
In addition, California has roughly 889,646 employer establishments,
which is almost double that of New York. 86 With population, land area, and
employer establishments in mind, California holds by far the largest market
size of three and arguably nationwide. As stated previously, a large market size
affords a jurisdiction greater bargaining power with corporations, especially
when the jurisdiction practically encompasses the entire West Coast of the U.S.
For these reasons, California’s ability to withstand pro-buyer influence is
accurately reflected in the jurisdiction’s treatment of the three aforementioned
M&A provisions. In many ways, California is a pro-seller or pro-worker
jurisdiction. California’s default rules prohibit sandbagging, waiver of jury
trial, and generally non-compete provisions, except for the narrow M&A
exemption for non-compete provisions. 87 The presence and dominance of
Silicon Valley may help explain a couple of these approaches. For example,
many high-tech firms that call California home benefit tremendously from the
free flow of ideas and human capital. This is supported by the fact that the
human capital for these high-tech firms is finite and, thus, not easily
replaceable due to the highly technical nature of their businesses and
specialized knowledge and skill requirements. 88 Additionally, the presence of
thousands of tech startups also helps rationalize why California leans more
towards a seller favorable jurisdiction. 89

83 Governor’s Budget Summary–2017-18, STATE OF CALIFORNIA (2017), http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/
2017-18/pdf/BudgetSummary/SummaryCharts.pdf.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 QuickFacts: California, supra note 83.
87 See Part II, supra.
88 See Tracey Lien, Changes to H-1B visa policy could have a chilling effect on the tech industry, LOS
ANGELES TIMES (Apr. 4, 2017, 6:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-silicon-valleyh1b-changes-20170404-story.html.
89 See Kriston Capps, Tech startups will never leave Silicon Valley — here’s why, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Dec. 26, 2015, 4:22 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/tech-startups-will-never-leave-silicon-valley-hereswhy-2015-12.
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CONCLUSION
This brief review of sandbagging, waiver of jury trial, and non-compete
provisions in Delaware, New York, and California demonstrates the complex
impact a governing jurisdiction can have on a M&A deal. Each of these states
in one way or another approaches the M&A provisions differently, which
ultimately may materially alter a contract or agreement.
At this point, one might be considering why anything stated above is even
relevant given that today many business entities have substantial relationships
or significant contacts in several different jurisdictions. While such business
entities have great flexibility and can be strategic in choosing their choice of
law or the governing law of their contracts or agreements, it is always best to
be prepared, especially in transactions such as M&A deals that are large in
scope and prone to failure. 90 Without plunging into a detailed discussion
regarding civil procedure, the study of forum selection itself is complex and
multifaceted. For example, in Keener v. Convergys Corp., even though the
parties selected Ohio law to apply to their employment agreement and
expected Ohio law to apply, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
application of Georgia law, which served to invalidate the employment
agreement’s non-compete provision. 91 The Eleventh Circuit held that Georgia
law applied over Ohio law, because Georgia had a “materially greater interest”
in applying its law. 92 This greater interest stemmed from the employee being a
resident of Georgia and non-compete provisions violating long-standing
Georgia public policy. 93 While most cases and contract disputes do not result
in another jurisdiction governing the contract, choice of law or governing law
provisions will not always be effective and followed by courts. It would
behoove an individual or party drafting a contract or agreement to be aware of
the related jurisdiction’s default rules in the unlikely scenario that the
jurisdiction invalidates their drafted forum selection clause and applies its
default rules to the transaction.

90 Lucinda Shen, These Are the Biggest Deals to Fall Apart in 2016, FORTUNE (May 12, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/05/12/biggest-deals-fall-apart-2016/; Lucinda Shen, M&A Breakups Have Cost Wall
Street $1.2 Billion in 2016 Alone, FORTUNE (May 5, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/05/merger-breakupscost-wall-street/; see Justin Zeth, Revenue lost from withdrawn M&A at highest level since 2007, DEALOGIC
(May 4, 2016), http://www.dealogic.com/insights/global-withdrawn-ma-revenue-highest-since-2007/.
91 342 F.3d 1264, 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2003).
92 Keener, 342 F.3d at 1267 (quoting Keener v. Convergys Corp., 312 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2002)).
93 Id. at 1271.
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In conclusion, jurisdictional default rules play a crucial role in every M&A
transaction. This Essay’s analysis serves to ensure more M&A deals reach
closing and the prevention of future litigation. Once one acknowledges the
importance of jurisdictional default rules in the context of mergers and
acquisitions, one will have the upper hand in any M&A deal and the ability to
forge a truly beneficial agreement. As discussed in Part II, default rules may
alter a purchase price by millions as well as dictate the course of negotiations
and drafting. For example, a buyer in California will push to have language
included in the agreement that expressly states his or her knowledge does not
alter his or her reliance on the seller’s representations or warranties while, at
the same time, a buyer in Delaware will not even mention this. Similarly, a
buyer in California in order to avoid going to trial will negotiate for an
arbitration agreement while a buyer in Delaware may just draft a waiver of jury
trial provision. This Essay’s analysis also serves to provide a more thorough
understanding of jurisdictional default rules to allow for the speculation of
their viability as well as to predict how certain jurisdictions may act in the
future. As discussed in Part III, there are several interconnected reasons that
explain and determine a jurisdiction’s treatment of M&A provisions. The
state’s dependence on franchise taxes and corporate fees, the state’s market
size, and the state’s special interest groups all play a role in determining
whether a jurisdiction adopts pro-buyer or pro-seller stance regarding its
default rules as demonstrated via the case studies of Delaware, New York, and
California.
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